












EUROMOD Working Paper No. EM9/04 
 
THE ROLE OF TAX AND TRANSFERS IN 
REDUCING PERSONAL INCOME INEQUALITY 




Magda Mercader-Prats and Horacio Levy 
 
December 2004  
The role of tax and transfers in reducing personal Income Inequality in 
Europe’s regions: Evidence from EUROMOD 
 
Magda Mercader-Prats and Horacio Levy
1  





In this paper we use statistical tools and graphic devices in order to give a 
comprehensive picture of income inequality levels in a set of 100 EU-15 regions at the 
end of the XX century before and after the operation of the tax-benefit. Our analysis is 
based on EUROMOD, the first multi-country tax-benefit model built with a common 
framework that includes detailed information on taxes and benefits paid and received by 
individuals and/or households from  samples  that are representative for the 15 EU 
countries. Our analysis  focuses on intraregional inequality and it explores the 
relationship between regional inequality levels (both in market incomes and disposable 
incomes) and economic performance. Our main findings indicate that tax-benefits 
systems in Europe notably reduce market inequality in all EU regions and that the size 
of this reduction (i.e. redistributive effect) depends crucially on (i) the market inequality 
level of the region (positively), (ii) the relative economic performance of the region in 
the country (negatively) and (iii) the country to which the region belongs. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The policy choices made by governments when establishing their tax-benefit systems 
are important in distinguishing final income inequality levels. As Atkinson (2000) 
highlights, accounting for the redistributive role of the government budget is crucial 
when looking for explanations of the extent and timing of changes in the income 
distribution. This paper is concerned with the impact of the government budget, 
particularly taxes and transfers, on the extent of personal income inequality in European 
regions. Our aim is to provide new empirical evidence for income inequality in 
Europe’s regions. We use statistical tools and graphic devices in order to give a 
comprehensive picture of income inequality levels in a set of 100 EU-15 regions at the 
end of the XX century before and after the operation of the tax-benefit.  
 
Despite the relevance of the topic in both economic and social policy literature, the lack 
of comparative personal micro-data on pre-tax-benefit and post-tax-benefit incomes has 
impeded systematic analyses on the matter. Until recently, comparable estimates of the 
income distribution before and after the redistributive role of the state among countries 
have been scarce. Work by Atkinson et al (1995) - relying on the Luxembourg Income 
Study data -, Wagstaff et al (1999), Heady et al (1999) and Förster and Pellizzari (2000) 
has contributed in this direction. However, the lack of consistency in definitions for 
components of income, population coverage, quality of the data on taxes and transfers 
and policy coverage in different countries have restricted (in one way or another) the 
degree of comparability of their estimates.  
 
Some of these difficulties, although not all, are overcome in this work. Our analysis 
uses EUROMOD which is the first multi-country tax-benefit model built  with  a 
common framework that includes detailed information on taxes and benefits paid and 
received by individuals and/or households from samples that are representative for the 
15 EU countries. 
 
Our interest focuses on inequality and redistribution at the level of the region.  Regions 
provide particularly interesting case studies. Firstly, nation-state inequality averages 
may disguise important internal regional differences, given the existing heterogeneity 
among EU regions in terms of socio-economic and political institutions. Work by   6
Stewart (2002), Jesuit et al (2002) and more recently Berthoud (2004) stress this point 
by providing a systematic analysis of the regional dimension of disposable income 
inequality and/or poverty in EU countries.  Secondly, the regional dimension of 
inequality and poverty is also important in the current context of growing government 
decentralisation: regional authorities within the EU member states are responsible for an 
important part of the tasks carried out by the public sector including redistribution in 
many countries. Moreover, any movement towards making effective the principle of 
‘subsidarity’ in the EU context needs a closer look at the level of regions. 
Complementing the nation-state approach with a regional one is therefore important. 
 
Focussing on intraregional inequality,  our  study  departs from the  standard  regional 
analysis concerned with the convergence of GDP across states and regions. Instead, we 
explore in detail the relationship between regional inequality levels (both in market 
incomes and disposable incomes) and economic performance. Are relatively poorer 
regions more unequal than well-off regions before the tax-benefit system operates? To 
what extent does the situation change when public redistribution takes place? Of course 
we expect national tax-benefit systems with a larger redistributive impact at the country 
level to have a larger redistributive impact in their territorial units or regions. But, are 
national tax-benefits equally effective in reducing inequality levels in rich and in less 
well-off regions of a given country? Is there any common pattern observed in the 
different countries? 
 
Evaluation the distributional impact of tax-benefit policy is a complex task. It is 
important to point out that our analysis only  provides a  partial assessment of the 
redistributive effect of tax-benefit systems. Our analysis does not take into account the 
whole redistributive impact of the public policy but only the arithmetic redistributive 
effect of cash tax-benefit policy. This i s restrictive in at least three important ways. 
2 
Firstly, countries and regions may show a reduced redistributive effect when looking at 
monetary redistribution but a substantially larger redistributive impact when benefits in 
kind are taken into account. 
3 Secondly, we compare inequality before the operation of 
                                                 
 
2 For a discussion of the difficulties of evaluating the effect of e conomic policy (not just fiscal policy) on 
income distribution with a focus on developing countries see Bourguignon et Pereira da Silva (2003). 
They provide a compendium of existing techniques for evaluation and show the complexity of the topic. 
3 Gardiner et al (1995) show that taking account of the health and housing system differences across 
countries had a significant impact on international comparisons of income distribution.   7
the tax-benefit system and inequality post-tax-benefit in a context in which market 
inequality is taken as given. There is no attempt to take into account the possible effects 
the tax-benefit may have had in the past or present level of economic performance and 
market inequality; nor the other way around - the possible effects of market conditions 
on the current tax-benefit systems. Finally, our  analysis focuses only on assessing 
vertical yearly redistribution. This is obviously restrictive as many tax-benefit 
instruments are designed to be redistributing over the life-cycle.  
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we describe EUROMOD, the tax-
benefit model used in our analysis. We document the regional information used as well 
as some methodological choices involved in our analysis. Before going into the analysis 
at regional level, in Section 3 we provide a country’s overview of the redistributive role 
of the tax-benefit system in each country. Section 4 is devoted to the analysis of 
“Market Gini” (i.e. the Gini coefficient of market income) in EU regions. We study the 
correlation between market Gini and average regional income levels. The analysis of 
“Disposable Gini” (i.e. the Gini coefficient once the tax-benefit system has operated) in 
EU regions occupies Section 5. Section 6 describes the redistributive effect of the tax-
benefit system. In section 7 we report the co-movements between inequality, 
redistribution and economic performance among EU regions and in Section 8 we assess 
the country fixed effect on regional inequality. A summary of our main results and some 
policy implications derived from them are summarized in the final section. 
 
2. Data issues and methodology 
 
2.1. EUROMOD: an EU-15 tax-benefit model  
 
EUROMOD is an integrated tax-benefit micro simulation model for all countries of the 
European Union-15. It was developed by a research team involving researchers from 18 
Institutions in 15 EU countries, co-ordinated by the Micro simulation Unit at the 
University of Cambridge. This model is a powerful instrument for research on tax-
benefit reform in a comparative or from a supra-national (European) perspective.
4 
 
                                                 
4 For details about the EUROMOD’s team and project, see  its website: 
http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/dae/mu/emod.    8
EUROMOD is a source of harmonized micro-data on the different income components 
“before” and “after” redistribution though the tax-benefit system has taken place. The 
data represents the population of private households in the different countries of the EU-
15. The EUROMOD databases are summarised in Table 1.  
 
Taxes and transfers paid and received by individuals and households are either fully 
simulated by EUROMOD or taken from the original data. For instance, the personal 
income tax and the social insurance contributions are simulated in all countries, but in 
most of them the model neither simulates taxes on capital, inheritance, real estate and 
property. There are some exceptions: Property tax is simulated in Belgium and included 
(but not simulated) in Finland and France. On the benefit side, in most countries the 
model does not simulate pensions in-kind, contributory and disability benefits (these are 
taken from the data), because the information needed to simulate is not available in the 
database. Thus, EUROMOD mainly simulates income-tested benefits as data is required 
that is more frequently available. Currently, EUROMOD simulates the tax-benefit 
systems of EU-15 countries for year 1998 so income figures from the original surveys 
have been updated to this reference year.  
 
Finally, EUROMOD does not have an integrated method to model tax evasion and non-
take-up of benefits. A comprehensive description of the EUROMOD model including 
data quality issues, policy scope and model design can be found in Sutherland (ed) 
(2001).  See Mantovani and Sutherland (2003)  too  for a discussion of the factors 
affecting the reliability of EUROMOD estimates of household disposable income.
5 
 
<Insert Table 1> 
 
2.2. Regional information in EUROMOD 
 
                                                 
5 Notable differences across countries in the underlying data sources that should be born in mind when 
interpreting results include (a) for Sweden income is aggregated over the narrow family unit (single 
person or couple plus children aged under 18. i.e., individuals aged 18 or more are all treated as not living 
with their parents) whereas for other countries the data allow us to use the wider household – all people 
living in one dwelling and sharing some of the costs of living; (b) the reference time period for incomes 
for most countries is one year, but for Ireland and the UK it is shorter (a month or a week for most 
sources of income).    9
Table 2 shows the regional information available in EUROMOD. The databases in 
EUROMOD for each country have different levels of regional aggregation. Most 
countries follow the NUTS system. Ireland, Luxembourg and Sweden use different 
systems. Most countries have regional data at NUTS1 level. However, for France and 
Portugal, NUTS2 is available and for Finland NUTS3. 
<Insert Table 2> 
 
NUTS2 is particularly useful in Portugal - NUTS1 divides the country into two regions: 
the continental part and the Islands of Açores and Madeira. NUTS2 is also relevant for 
France (régions). NUTS1 is in turn appropriate in Germany (Länders) and the UK. 
Regional data for the UK is at NUTS1 level; however, the southeast region is split into 
NUTS2, since ‘greater London’ is identified separately. In Italy NUTS1 is available (we 
do not have the Provinces) but the southern region distinguishes Basilicata/Calabria and 
Puglia. Unfortunately, NUTS2, corresponding to Spanish regional governments, is not 
available. 
 
Table 2 summarizes the regional information we use for each country. For Sweden and 
Finland, we grouped regions into NUTS2 to keep some degree of comparability with 
the other countries while Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands are not 
considered in our analysis because no regional information is available. The total 
number of regions considered is 100. 
 
Table 2 also shows the average population size per region and total number of regions 
per country. The average population per region varies from less than 1 million people in 
Finland to 5.5 million people in Spain.  Out of the total number of regions considered, 
France concentrates 22 of the regions analysed, while Austria  and  Belgium  only 3 
regions each and Greece 4. For the other countries, the number of regions is in the range 
6 to 12.  
 
In sum, we believe that the regional information offered in EUROMOD is rich enough 
for our analysis to be of interest. Nevertheless, the reader should keep in mind that the 
significance of “regions” widely varies among countries. For instance, while have just 
pointed out that in Spain regions correspond to an arbitrary aggregation of CCAA 
(regional governments), in others we are able to identify the big metropolitan areas.   10
Moreover, in some countries the usefulness of the regional analysis may be limited 
because regions are too heterogeneous. This is the case of Austria in which the East 
region involves the rich Vienna as well as the very poor region of Burgenland and 




One of the common problems distributional estimates at regional level present is the 
small sample size available. Table 3 shows the sample size available for the different 
regions. In our case, this is a severe problem in only a few regions such us Corse in 
France for which only 38 observations are available in our sample, Bremen in Germany 
with only 65 observations and Ahvenanmaa/aland in Finland with 62 observations. 
These regions are the ones with the lowest population in each country. For statistical 
reasons, it may be appropriate to merge some of these regions with others in the 
country. However, to avoid artificial merging, the figures presented below use the 
whole 100 regions, providing standard errors of the regional inequality estimates.  
 
<Insert Table 3> 
 
2.3. Income definitions and other methodological choices  
 
2.3.1. Income definitions 
 
Our market income variable includes all components of market i ncome: wages and 
salaries and self-employment income (net of employer insurance contributions and other 
benefits, but gross of employee contributions to such schemes), property income 
(interest, rents, dividends) as well as occupational pensions from employers, regular 
interhousehold cash transfers and other sources of income which are not redistributive 




                                                 
6 For the procedures used to impute gross amounts from net incomes see Immerwoll and O’Donoghue 
(2001).   11
The  disposable income variable is market income plus all s ocial transfers minus 
employee Social Insurance Contributions, personal income taxes and other taxes. Figure 
1 summarizes the elements of the tax-benefit systems that have been taken into account 
for the conversion from market Income to disposable Income in EUROMOD. Indirect 
taxes are not considered. In Sutherland ed. (2001) (pages 63 to 76) there is detail about 
the components included in disposable income for each country 
7.  The EUROMOD 
Country Reports  (listed in the reference list)  offer  detailed explanations about the 
content of these variables for each country.  
 
<Insert Figure 1> 
 
By looking at the variables included in the disposable income definition for each 
country it can be seen that most of the tax-benefit components considered by 
EUROMOD are established at national level. In most countries the central government 
is responsible for the overall redistribution.  Austria and Germany are the only two 
countries with noticeable regional benefits. These include several benefits, which are 
specific to states and provinces. In the case of Austria, the Family Bonus, Disability 
Benefit, Social Assistance and Housing Support are partly established at the level of the 
province.  Likewise, in Germany, there is provincial  Child  Raising  Allowance  and 
Social  Assistance  Complements  (cost of living  assistance and assistance in special 
circumstances) given at the level of the Länders. For Sweden and Finland, local income 
tax is an important component of income taxation and social assistance varies to some 
extent across regions too.  
 
It should be taken into account that for most countries, EUROMOD is not able to model 
detailed policy instruments at the regional and local level. For instance, in Spain the 
minimum income  programmes  established by the regional governments are not 
modelled because NUTS2 information is not available.  In most cases, data constraints 
are the main argument for not considering local and regional taxation (See the Country 
Reports listed in the reference list). 
 
2.3.2. The frequency of zeros in the market income variable 
                                                 
7 See also baseline output available at http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/dae/mu/emodstats/index.htm available 
now for years 1998 and 2001.   12
 
There is one important question to address, which relates to the frequency of zero 
incomes in the market income variable.  
 
Zero incomes in the market income variable affect over 10 per cent of the whole EU 
sample. The distribution of zero incomes among countries and regions is not randomly 
distributed. Zero market incomes are over 20 per cent in Austria, Belgium and Portugal 
and above 17 per cent of the sample in Spain and Greece whereas the frequency of zero 
incomes is less important in Finland, France, Germany and Italy (around 5 per cent) and 
is below 1 per cent in Sweden.  
 
This substantial divergence raises doubts of comparability among countries of market 
inequality levels, especially concerning the reliability of non-labour market incomes in 
countries such as Austria, Belgium, Portugal, Spain and Greece. Our main problem is 
that we are not able to distinguish true zero incomes (for instance, pensioners with no 
other income) from measurement error. Dropping zero incomes from both income 
distributions seems not appropriated in our case. Any ad hoc imputation to the market 
income variable would be arbitrary too. For these reasons, we decided to leave zero 
incomes in the computations shown below. Note that leaving zero incomes is likely to 
lead  to overestimating market inequality in countries in which zero incomes are 
disproportionately frequent.  
 
The frequency of negative incomes is less than 0.05 per cent and zero incomes are 
concentrated in Sweden. Zero and negative income is much less of a problem in the 
disposable income variable, affecting only 0.25 per cent of the whole sample.
8 
 
Comparisons of inequality levels among countries and regions are likely to be affected 
by any systematic difference in the quality of the data in the different countries and by 
any other country specific characteristic. 
 
2.3.3. Other methodological choices 
                                                 
8 In various studies analysing disposable inequality and poverty the importance of making top and bottom 
coding is emphasized (See Stewart (2002), Gottchalk and Smeeding (1997)). Atkinson et a l (1995) also 
performed some top and bottom coding in their analysis of market inequality, but they considered only 
non-zero respondents. Our analysis does not make any bottom or top coding.    13
 
In all estimates made in this paper (using market and disposable income), we use the 
personal income distribution in each country and region constructed under the following 
assumptions. Each individual gets the equivalent income of the household to which it 
belongs. This implies that the household as the unit of analysis (i.e. inequalities within 
the household are not taken into account). Equivalent income is estimated by means of 
the modified OECD scale. Inequality is measured solely by the Gini coefficient and that 
of the redistributive role of the state measured by the difference between market Gini 
and disposable Gini. We are aware that this set of assumptions is restrictive. For 
instance, Atkinson and Brandolini (2003) have emphasised the need to look at different 




Given the lack of PPP factors at the level of the regions, when comparisons in average 
income across regions are made, there are no PPP adjustments taken into account. 
10The 
Danish, Swedish and UK currencies were converted into Euro using the exchange rate 
of December 31st, 1998. The whole analysis refers to 1998 annual incomes. 
 
Standard errors were computed for all indices using bootstrap. Bootstrap is a technique 
based on re-sampling with replacement (Efron and Tibshirani, 1993). Given a random 
sample Z = (z
1, z
2,…, z




*B are drawn so that 




n*) is a random sample of size n from the 




*B).  The bootstrap estimate of the standard 
error is then computed as the standard deviation of the bootstrap replicates: 
 
2 / 1 2
1 1


























B B Z Z
B
e s
   
 
In the graphical presentations of results which follow the reliability of estimates is 
shown using confidence intervals that have been constructed to be significant at the 5% 
level: i.e.+/- 1.96 * estimated (￿e B). 
 
                                                 
9 This is an issue that deserves further research in the future. 
10 This is an issue that deserves further research in the future.   14
3. The redistributive impact of taxes and transfers: A country’s overview 
 
EUROMOD has been recently used to study the redistributive effect of taxes Verbist 
(2004) and the combined effect of taxes and transfers (Immervoll et al (2004)) in EU-15 
countries. We refer to these two works for a detailed analysis of the contribution of the 
different taxes and benefits to the overall redistributive effect analysed here.  
 
Table 4 summarizes market Gini (GX), which is the Gini computed using the income 
distribution before taxes and transfers, and the disposable Gini (GY) which refers to the 
distribution once transfers have been added to market income and taxes have been 
deducted. The difference accounts for the redistributive effect of the national tax-benefit 
systems in the 15 EU countries.  
 
<Insert Table 4> 
 
There are several observations. Firstly, the market Gini is slightly above 0.5 in Portugal, 
Spain and Ireland. It is around 0.5 in the UK, Belgium, Italy and Sweden and slightly 
below 0.5 in Greece, Finland, Germany, and France. Austria, Denmark and, more 
markedly, the Netherlands show the lowest of market Ginis in the EU. Differences in 
gross Gini among countries are never larger than 0.1 points. The correlation between 
average gross income and market Gini is negative and statistically different from zero 
for a=0,05 significance level when considering all 15 countries together.  
 
The range of variation among countries in disposable Gini is wider. Disposable Gini 
ranks from 0.35 in Portugal to 0.23 in Austria. Higher inequality levels are in Southern 
countries, particularly (other than Portugal) Italy, Greece, followed by Spain, Ireland 
and the UK. At the other extreme with Gini coefficients between 0.23-0.26 we have 
Germany, Austria, Belgium, Finland, Denmark, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. For 
France and Sweden the Gini is around 0.28-0.29.
11 The correlation coefficient between 
disposable income inequality and average income levels is also negative and 
significantly different from zero for a=0,05  significance level.  
                                                 
11 These figures of market Gini are substantially higher than others derived using LIS (see for instance  
market income Gini in Atkinson et al (1995)). This is because zero incomes are considered here whereas 
market  inequality in Atkinson et al considers only  non-zero market incomes.    15
 
The redistributive effects of the tax and transfer system, measured as the Gini reduction, 
are greater in Finland and Belgium (around 0.23). In Austria, Sweden and Germany the 
figure is also above 0.2. At the other extreme, it is particularly low in Greece (0.14) 
Portugal and Italy. France, Spain and the UK are in an intermediate position (around 
0.19).  
 
The correlation coefficient between the redistributive effect and average country income 
is positive and statistically different from zero for a=0,05 significance level. Figure 2 
depicts the position of countries in a two-way scatter plot including the redistributive 
effect (RE) and mean average income, relative to European average. Low-income 
countries (Portugal, Spain and Greece) show a lower redistributive effect, although the 
Spanish RE is similar to that in some richer countries such as the UK and France. The 
redistributive effect of medium income countries is much contrasted: Italy has one of 
the lowest RE and Belgium and Finland show the largest.  
 
<Insert Figure 2> 
 
4. Market income inequality in EU regions 
 
To what extent does market income inequality differ in EU regions? Are regional gross 
inequality levels similar for all regions in a given country? How does inequality change 
with regional economic performance? 
 
Figure 3 shows the Gini coefficient in EU regions using our market income distribution 
and a confidence interval for this estimate. Countries and regions within a country are 
sorted by increasing (equivalent) income levels. Map 1 provides a picture of Europe in 
which regions are grouped into 5 classes according to the Gini level. Details about the 
relative position of the different regions in the EU ranking are included in Table A.16 in 
the appendix.  
 
<Insert Figure 3 and Map 1> 
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The market Gini ranges from 0.42 (in the French region of Haute-Normandie) to 0.607 
(in the Italian southern region of Sicilia). Among the lowest levels of market income 
inequality we find other regions in France (Alsace, Auvergne and Franche Comte), the 
West and South regions of Austria and some Italian regions ( Emilia, Lazio and 
Sardegna). At the other extreme, regions with the highest levels of gross income 
inequality are to be found in some of the poorest regions of Italy (Balisicata/Calabria 
and Sicilia), Portugal (Algarve and Açores), Spain (both Castillas and Extremadura, 
Andalucia and the north west region), Germany (Schleswig-Holstein and Sachsen-
Anhalt) and the North region and Northern Ireland in the UK. Market inequality is also 
relatively high in some of the more well off regions of the UK (Greater London) and 
Sweden (Stockholm). The majority of the regions (80% of the total) show a gross Gini 
coefficient between 0.44 and 0.53. 
 
Within a country, differences in internal regional inequality are important in Germany 
and particularly  in Italy. France, Spain, Portugal and the UK also show internal 
differences, although much smaller than Italy. In Greece, Finland, Austria and Belgium 
the gross Gini is more similar between regions. This can be clearly seen in Figure 4, a 
Box Plot, where the internal box line represents the median regional Gini and the box 
upper and lower  bands indicate the regional Gini at the 25
th and 75
th percentiles. The 
lines extending above and below the box report the minimum and the maximum Ginis 
in each country and the symbol ￿ the outliers. It is interesting to notice that regional 
gross income inequality levels appear to be rather independent from the country in 
which regions belong. This is further confirmed by means of the e stimation of an 
ANOVA model (See Table 5). A simple decomposition of the variance of the Ginis 
before the action of the tax-benefit shows that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that 
average regional market Ginis between countries are equal. In fact the country factor 
explains only 15% of the variance observed.  
 
<Insert Figure 4 and Table 5> 
 
Is there any correlation between inequality and average incomes at regional level? 
 
Looking first at what happens in regions of a given country, Figure 3 suggests that there 
is not a clear relationship between inequality levels and the relative economic   17
performance of the region. Internal regional inequality seems to increase with average 
regional income in Sweden and slightly decrease in Finland and Belgium. It shows an 
inverted U shape in Portugal (although it slightly increases in Lisboa), Greece and Spain 
whereas more irregular patterns in Italy, Germany, the UK and France. However, Figure 
3 does not take into account actual average income values in the different regions. A 
two-way scatter plot is shown in Figure 5, that provides market Gini by market average 
equivalent income (in logs) in the different regions for each country. The axes of these 
plots are common to all countries. Notice that for most countries, there is a negative 
correlation between gross inequality levels and the economic performance of the region. 
The negative correlation is particularly high in Greece, Spain, Finland and Italy but it 
can also be observed in France, Germany, the UK and, to a lesser extent, in Portugal.   
Notice that in most of these countries, gross inequality increases slightly for the most 
well off region in the country. In most cases these regions contain the capital city. Only 
in Austria, Belgium and Sweden the correlation between market average and inequality 
levels is positive. In Belgium and Austria, countries with only three regions in our 
sample, the richest region (which contains the capital) shows inequality levels higher 
than the other two regions in the country and it dominates the trend. In Sweden, all 
regions show very similar average income levels except the richest, Stockholm, with 
higher inequality levels.  
 
<Insert Figure 5> 
 
Figure 6 shows the relationship between average (log) market equivalent income and 
market Gini for all 100 EU regions taken together. We also provide a Nadaraya-Watson 
non-parametric kernel regression adjusted to this bivariate distribution. A bandwidth of 
0.4 is used and the weight function (kernel) to calculate the required univariate densities 
is biweight. We can see that the regression curve is rather flat for regions with very low 
average income levels (most regions in Portugal and the poorest regions of Spain, 
Greece and Italy) and the curve slightly decreases thereafter. More than 70 per cent of 
the regions are concentrated with an equivalent average income level above 1000 euros 
per month and the dispersion of original Gini among these relatively well-off regions is 
not so high. The small sample size of Bremen calls for care in its estimate. The case for 
the whole set of EU regions taken together suggests that we could be in the decreasing 
part of the inverted U curve as predicted by Kutznets.   18
 
<Insert Figure 6> 
 
This  negative association between market Gini and income is reinforced when the 
economic performance of the region is expressed as a relative magnitude of country’s 
performance. This can be seen clearly in Figure 7, which provides the two-way 
relationship between market Gini and the relative economic performance of the region 
in the country (expressed in logs). Relatively well-off regions in a given country show 
gross inequality levels significantly lower than the less-well off regions, particularly 
those regions below country average. Here, we can notice the relatively low market 
inequality levels in the richest regions of Spain (Madrid), France (Ille de France) and 
Italy (Emilia). 
 
<Insert Figure 7> 
 
5. Disposable income inequality in EU regions 
 
Map 2 and Figure 3 show the Gini coefficient using equivalent disposable income in the 
different regions. Table A.16. offers detail on the relative position of regions in the EU 
ranking in terms of the disposable Gini. 
 
<Insert Map 2>  
 
As we expected, for all  regions the tax and transfer system substantially reduces 
personal inequality measured by the Gini. The Gini after tax and transfers ranks from 
0.206 in the German region of Brandemburg to 0.377 again in Sicilia. Three Finnish 
regions (Väli-suomi, Etelä-suomi and Itä-suomi), four German regions (Sachsen-
Anhalt, Sachsen, Thüringen and Brandenburg) and two Austrian regions (South and 
West) are among those regions with lower inequality levels after the operation of the tax 
and benefit system. The higher positions in the ranking of disposable income inequality 
are occupied by most regions from Southern countries; in Greece (all regions except 
Athina), Açores, Lisboa and Centro in Portugal, Sicilia, Basilicata/Calabria and Puglia 
in Italy but also some capitals in richer countries like Stockholm and Greater London.  
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Given the diverging sizes and structures of the different tax-benefit systems, the 
regional ranking in terms of disposable Gini is substantially modified depending on the 
country in which the different regions belong. For instance, Itä-Suomi in Finland ranked 
in the 7
th position after tax-transfers, is in position 86 in terms of inequality in market 
income and Sachsen-Anhalt in Germany occupies the 88
th position “before” while is 
ranked the 3
rd “after” the tax and transfer system applies (See Table A.16).  
 
The level of disposable income inequality of a given region is to be observed as much 
more dependent on the country in which this region belongs. Figure 8 (box plot type) 
shows that most regions in Southern Europe (Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain) show a 
Gini coefficient above .3.  The UK regions follow with Gini coefficients around 0.3. 
Most French and Belgian regions are in the interval .25-.3. The lowest Gini are found in 
the Finnish regions and regions from Austria (values around .2-.25). There are 
significant differences in disposable inequality levels in regions in Sweden (between .25 
and .35) and Germany (from around .2 to .3).  
 
<Insert Figure 8> 
 
These differences are further confirmed by means of an ANOVA analysis. The 
ANOVA analysis rejects the null hypothesis that the average disposable Ginis between 
countries are the same. In fact, the country factor explains more  than  60% of  the 
variance of the disposable Gini. (See Table 6). Thus, the country is, through the national 
tax-benefit system, a decisive factor of regions’ disposable income inequality while this 
is not so in the case of market income inequality, particularly among relatively less well 
off regions in a country. 
 
<Insert Table 6> 
 
Is there any correlation between disposable inequality and gross average incomes? 
 
At the country level we again find no single tendency between disposable Gini and the 
economic performance of the region. The two-way scatter plot in Figure 9 provides the 
disposable Gini and average equivalent income in the different regions for each country. 
Notice that for most countries, there is now a positive correlation between gross   20
inequality levels and the economic performance of the region. Internal regional 
disposable inequality now increases with average income of the region in Austria, 
Finland, France, Germany, Portugal, Sweden and the UK. It decreases in Greece and 
Italy; it is more inverted U-shaped in Belgium and constant in Spain.  
 
<Insert Figure 9> 
 
Combining this information for all regions in the EU, the relationship between these 
two variables is rather different (See Figure 10). We can see a group of low-income 
regions with high net inequality levels (all from Southern Europe) and a second group 
of more well off regions with lower disposable Gini. The non-parametric regression 
adjusted to these data allows us to confirm that for the group of  better-off regions 
inequality tends to increase as average income rises.  Among the richest regions, 
Stockholm and Greater London show relatively high inequality levels. Thus, by looking 
at the inequality once the tax-benefit has operated in the different regions, the Kutznets 
hypothesis would not seem to work. As a result of the tax-benefit system, net income 
inequality increases with the income level of the region within a country for most 
countries. On average, for the whole set of EU regions, disposable income inequality 
decreases from the low income level regions to the majority of medium income levels, 
but increases again for medium-high average income level regions. 
 
<Insert Figure 10> 
 
The relationship between disposable income inequality and relative economic 
performance of the region in the country is also of interest. This relationship is shown in 
Figure 11. The nonparametric regression shows almost no variation of disposable 
inequality in this case. Relative inequality is slightly higher in relatively poor and rich 
regions of a given country once the tax-benefit system has operated, although the 
dispersion around the non-parametric regression is considerable. 
 
<Insert Figure 11> 
 
6. The role of tax and transfers in reducing personal inequality in EU regions 
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Differences between market and disposable income inequality account for the 
redistributive impact of the tax-benefit system. The Gini reduction in EU regions is 
spread between 0.11 to around 0.32 (See Figure 12 and Map 3). It is larger (greater than 
0.25) in one of the poorer Finnish regions (Itä-suomi), one Belgian region (Wallonie) 
and several German regions (Sachsen, Thüringen, Sachsen-Anhalt, Brandemburg and 
Hamburg). Conversily, the Gini reduction is smaller (lower than 0.15) in most Greek 
regions (except Athina), but also in several of the richest regions in southern European 
countries  (Madrid in Spain, Emilia, North, Lombardia, Lazio in Italy and Norte in 
Portugal) and the South East region in England.  
 
As we expected, average Gini reduction of regions in a given country is very close to 
the countries’ redistributive effect shown in Section 3. On average regional inequality is 
most reduced in the Belgian regions, followed by the regions in Finland and Germany. 
In all these countries the average reduction is above 0.23. The average redistributive 
impact is around 0.2 in Austria and the Swedish and French regions and just below that 
in the UK and Spain. Finally, the redistributive impact is between 0.14 and 0.17 per cent 
in Greece, Italy and Portugal. The variation of the redistributive impact between regions 
of a given country is considerable. 
 
<Insert Figure 12 and Map 3> 
 
The same sort of information is provided by Figures 13 and 14, which show the 
relationship between the Gini reduction and average market (log) income. As we could 
predict from our previous analysis, Figure 13 shows that the effectiveness of the tax-
benefit system appears to be relatively low among the group of poorer regions of 
Portugal, Spain, Greece and Italy. For regions with average monthly gross income 
around 1.100 (per equivalent adult) the degree of effectiveness increases although is 
greatly spread. For the richest regions, the effectiveness decreases again. 
 
The negative relationship between redistributive effect and economic performance is 
clearer when average incomes are expressed in relative terms to the country average. 
This relationship is shown in Figure 14, which is close to linear.  As can be clearly seen, 
the relative performance of national tax-benefit systems in terms of redistributive   22
impact is higher in relatively less well-off regions and lower in the best performing 
ones. 
 
<Insert Figure 13 and 14> 
 
7. Co-movements: inequality, redistribution and economic performance 
 
In our previous analysis we have shown that the country in which the region is located 
is, through the tax-benefit system, decisive in the disposable income inequality of the 
region while it is not in the case of market inequality. 
 
But given the negative and significant correlation between average country incomes and 
income inequality (See Table 4) we expect market and, even more, disposable 
inequality at regional level to depend on the economic performance of the country 
(relative to EU average). Table 7 shows OLS fit of market and disposable Ginis against 
the relative economic performance of the region (region_rel) and the relative 
performance of the country (relative to European average) (country_rel) as summarized 


























j is the market and disposable Gini in region i in country j, ln(Xi
j/X
j) 
is the log of market equivalent income in region i expressed in relation to the country 
average and ln(X
j/X) is the log of market income in country j in relation to the EU 
average. Regional relative income is significant and negative for market inequality and 
national relative income is significant too although to a lesser extent; national relative 
income is significant and positive for disposable Gini and regional relative income is 
not.  
 
<Insert Table 7> 
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The redistributive effect, in turn, depends not only on the country relative performance 
but also on the regional relative performance. Table 7 shows also the results of fitting 
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Given a market Gini coefficient, regions in  better-off countries will show a larger 
redistributive effect, but relative well-off regions within a country will see their 
redistributive impact limited. The size of these two effects is about the same on average. 
 
Taking into account these different elements, our analysis shows that the redistributive 
impact of national tax-benefit systems on regional inequality positively depends on the 
relative income level of the country and negatively on the relative economic 
performance of the region. This implies systematic rank order changes between market 
and disposable Ginis: from high market Ginis to low disposable Ginis in rich countries’ 
regions, as well as from low market Ginis to high disposable Ginis in relatively rich 
regions of a given country. The poorest outcomes in terms of redistributive impact are 
found in relatively rich regions of less well off countries.  
 
8. The “country effect” on regional inequality 
 
Our analysis also suggests that behind the country’s economic performance there are 
quite different country redistributive experiences. It makes sense, therefore, to replace in 
equation above the country’s economic performance by a set of country dummies (fixed 















2 3 1 0 ) / ln(  
 
Where  Yi Xi G G - measures the redistributive impact of the tax and transfer system in 
region  i, and as in previous equation  Xi G  is the market Gini, ln(Xi
j/X
j) is the log of 
region market income expressed in relation to the country  average (region_rel) and Pji 
is a country dummy for each region. The country dummy (or country fixed effect) 
measures differences in regional inequality that cannot be attributed to “market”   24
inequality or to regional relative economic performance. The fixed effect would be 
picking up differences in the structure and size of tax-benefit system as well as other 
country specificities attributed, among other things, to data quality in countries.  
 
<Insert Table 8> 
 
The adjustment of this regression is high as the R -squared value is 0.85. The results 
indicate several interesting facts. As expected, there is a positive correlation between the 
redistributive impact of the tax-benefit system and market inequality. Once we control 
by the “country” dummy, the redistributive effect of the tax-benefit is lower in more 
prosperous regions (ß2 is negative). In other words, in a given country, the tax benefit 
system is more effective in poor than in rich regions. The “country” fixed effect enables 
countries to be grouped in 4 categories. The largest “country” effect takes place in 
regions of Austria, Belgium, Germany and Finland (Group 1). The poorest effect is in 
regions of Southern countries (Portugal, Greece and Italy-Group 4). On average, these 
Southern regions show a Gini reduction of 0.08 points lower than those in “similar” 
regions of Austria, Belgium and Finland. The country impact is also important in France 
and Sweden (Group 2). In these cases, the tax-benefit system would explain Gini 
reductions around 0.02 lower than the one in an equivalent region in Group 1. Finally, 
regions in the UK and Spain would show a post tax-benefit Gini 0.04 points more than 
equivalent regions in Group 1.  
 
Table 9 summarizes the test regarding the differences in parameters ß 3 by pairs of 
countries. We have performed the test ß3j- ß3k= 0  for country j different from country k.  
An ‘=’ means that the redistributive effect in regions in the two countries compared is 
not statistically different. ‘+’ implies that a region in country in row shows a larger 
redistributive effect than a region in country in column. The four groups of countries 
above mentioned can be clearly identified. 
 
<Insert Table 9> 
 
8. Final comments 
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The main findings from our description of inequality levels before and after 
redistribution through the tax-benefit systems in 100 EU regions can be summarised as 
follows. 
 
Both market and disposable regional inequality levels differ significantly in the different 
EU regions but in very different ways. We have found that tax-benefits systems in 
Europe notably reduce market inequality in all EU regions and that the size of this 
reduction (i.e. redistributive effect) depends crucially on:  
(i)  the market inequality level of the region 
(ii)  the country to which the region belongs, and its economic performance 
(iii)  the relative economic performance of the region  in the country. 
 
Firstly, the size of the redistributive impact is larger in more unequal regions in terms of 
market income. Secondly, more redistributive systems at the level of the whole country 
show a larger redistributive impact in its territorial units. The best performing systems 
in terms of internal regional inequality reduction appear to be Finland, Germany, 
Austria and Belgium. The tax-benefit systems of Sweden and France would make up 
the 2nd best performing group. The 3
rd would be Spain and the UK. Finally, the lower 
redistributive impact groups the systems in Greece, Portugal and Italy. Moreover, EU 
regional evidence suggests a positive co-movement between the country’s economic 
performance and the inequality reduction: the richer a country is, the l arger is its 
redistributive impact on regional inequality. We have emphasised that differences in the 
redistributive effect among countries cannot be attributable only to the size and structure 
of the tax-benefit system but also to systematic differences i n other country specific 
characteristics such as income data quality.   
 
Thirdly, the richer the region is in the country, the more limited the redistributive 
impact is. The redistributive impact turns out to be particularly high for the poorest 
regions in a country, but particularly weak in the wealthiest ones, often urban regions 
including the capital city of the country.  Paradoxically, some of the new forms of 
extreme poverty and wealth are particularly associated to “richer” and more urban 
regions. This finding suggests the need for further intervention at the level of the 
regional and “metropolitan” governments.  
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Our analysis also provides new evidence on the relationship between inequality and 
economic performance in the EU regions. This relationship turns out to depend on the 
income distribution chosen (market or disposable income). While for the 100 EU 
regions taken together, we find a negative relationship between market income 
inequality and economic performance (this is also the case for the majority of individual 
countries) it is not the case when disposable Gini is considered. Moreover, interestingly, 
while regional market inequality levels appear to be rather independent from the country 
in which the regions belong, the country factor explains more than two thirds of the 
variance of the disposable regional income inequality.   27
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Tables and figures  
 
Table 1: Databases used in each country 
Country  Base Dataset for EUROMOD  Date of 
collection 
Reference time 
period for incomes 
Austria  Austrian version of European Community 
Household Panel (W5) 
1999  annual 1998 
Belgium  Panel Survey on Belgian Households (W6)  1999  annual 1998 
Denmark  European Community Household Panel (W2)   1995  annual 1994 
Finland  Income distribution survey   1998  annual 1998 
France  Budget de Famille  1994/5  annual 1993/4 
Germany  German Socio-Economic Panel (W15)  1998  annual 1997 
Greece  European Community Household Panel (W2)  1995  annual 1995 
Ireland  Living in Ireland Survey (W1)  1994  month in 1994 
Italy  Survey of Households Income and Wealth   1996  annual 1995 
Luxembourg  PSELL-2 (W5)  1999  annual 1998 
Netherlands  Sociaal-economisch panelonderzoek (W3)  1996  annual 1995 
Portugal  European Community Household Panel (W3)  1996  annual 1995 
Spain  European Community Household Panel (W3)  1996  annual 1995 
Sweden  Income distribution survey   1997  annual 1997 
UK  Family Expenditure Survey   1995/6  monthly in 1995/6 
 
 












Austria  NUTS1  NUTS1  2,645,969  3 
Belgium  NUTS1  NUTS1  3,299,186  3 
Denmark  NUTS1  Not considered     
Finland  NUTS3  NUTS2  814,532  6 
France  NUTS2  NUTS2  2,588,033  22 
Germany  NUTS1  NUTS1  4,966,341  16 
Greece  NUTS1  NUTS1  2,635,525  4 
Ireland  Different system  Not considered     
Italy  NUTS1+ South Split  NUTS1+ South Split  4,767,237  12 
Luxembourg  Dif. System  Not considered     
Netherlands  NUTS1  Not considered     
Portugal  NUTS2  NUTS2  1,417,429  7 
Spain  NUTS1  NUTS1  5,557,837  7 
Sweden  Dif. System  NUTS2  1,123,557  8 




4,786,980  12 
   31





+ employment income 
+ self-employment income 
+ capital income 
+ property income 
+ other sources of market income 
+ insurance pensions 
+ unemployment benefits 
+ social assistance benefits 
+ old-age, family and invalidity benefits 
+ housing benefits 
+ 
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Table 3: Regions in EUROMOD and sample sizes. 
Country  Country 




Portugal  12  Madeira  PT3  598
  12  Açores  PT2  599
  12  Algarve  PT15  637
  12  Centro  PT12  1,027
  12  Alentejo  PT14  514
  12  Norte  PT11  840
  12  Lisboa E Vale Do Tejo  PT13  591
       
Greece  7  Thraki, Makedonia, Thessalia  GR1  1,660
  7  Dellada, Sterea, Pelloponisos, Ionia Nisia Ipiros  GR2  1,251
  7  Notio Aigaio, Voreio Aigaio, Kriti  GR4  656
  7  Athina  GR3  1,601
       
Spain  13  Canarias  ES7  380
  13  Andalucia, Murcia  ES6  1,013
  13  Cast Leon, Cast Mancha, Extremadura  ES4  959
  13  Galicia, Asturias, Cantabria  ES1  895
  13  Catalunya, Valen, Baleares  ES5  1,375
  13  Euskadi, Navarra, Rioja, Aragón  ES2  960
  13  Madrid  ES3  537
       
Italy  9  Sicilia   ITA  559
  9  Basilicata/Calabria  IT92  389
  9  Campania  IT8  709
  9  Puglia   IT91  520
  9  Sardegna  ITB  295
  9  Abruzzo-Molise  IT7  396
  9  Lazio   IT6  411
  9  Center  IT5  1,250
  9  North-east  IT3  1,009
  9  North-west  IT1  1,048
  9  Lombardia  IT2  824
  9  Emilia   IT4  725
       
Belgium  2  Flandre  BE2  1,961
  2  Wallonie  BE3  1,300
  2  Bruxelles  BE1  393
       
Sweden  14  Smaland med oarna  SE03  1,607
  14  Norra Melansverige  SE06  1,235
  14  Mellersta Norrland  SE07  888
  14  Ovre Norrland  SE08  1,049
  14  Vastsverige  SE05  4,448
  14  Sydsverige  SE04  2,889
  14  Östra mellansverige  SE02  3,404
  14  Stockholm  SE01  4,114
       
Finland  4  Itä-suomi  FI13  1,394
  4  Väli-suomi  FI14  1,364
  4  Pohjois-suomi  FI15  762
  4  Etelä-suomi  FI12  3,276
  4  Ahvenanmaa/aland  FI2  44
  4  Uusimaa  FI11  2,152
       
UK  15  Northern Ireland  UKB  134
  15  North  UK1  405  33
  15  West Midlands  UK7  621
  15  Scotland  UKA  604
  15  Yorks & Humberside  UK2  594
  15  East Anglia  UK4  282
  15  North West  UK8  722
  15  Wales  UK9  339
  15  East Midlands  UK3  491
  15  South West  UK6  637
  15  South East  UK5  1,274
  15  Greater London  UK55  694
       
Germany 6  Thüringen  DEG  358
  6  Sachsen-Anhalt  DEE  356
  6  Sachsen  DED  594
  6  Mecklenburg-Vorpommern  DE8  216
  6  Brandenburg  DE4  318
  6  Rheinland Pfalz / Saarland  DEB  417
  6  Bremen  DE5  61
  6  Berlin-Ost  DE3  189
  6  Niedersachsen  DE9  626
  6  Baden-Würtemberg  DE1  934
  6  Hamburg  DE6  97
  6  Bayern  DE2  984
  6  Saarland  DEC  134
  6  Nordrhein Westfalen  DEA  1,508
  6  Schleswig-Holstein  DEF  190
  6  Hessen  DE7  498
       
France  5  Corse  FR83  38
  5  Nord-Pas De Calais  FR3  715
  5  Basse-Normandie  FR25  281
  5  Auvergne  FR72  234
  5  Champagne-Ardennes  FR21  305
  5  Poitou-Charentes  FR53  309
  5  Languedoc-Roussillon  FR81  437
  5  Bretagne  FR52  582
  5  Pays De La Loire  FR51  653
  5  Centre  FR24  434
  5  Limousin  FR63  153
  5  Franche Comte  FR43  256
  5  Bourgogne  FR26  320
  5  Aquitaine  FR61  585
  5  Midi-Pyrenees  FR62  523
  5  Haute-Normandie  FR23  355
  5  Picardie  FR22  305
  5  Rhone-Alpes  FR71  949
  5  Provence-Alpes-Cote Dazur  FR82  879
  5  Lorraine  FR41  472
  5  Alsace  FR42  367
  5  Ile De France  FR1  2,139
       
Austria  1  West: Oberösterreich, Salzburg, Tirol, Vorarlberg  AT3  879
  1  South: Kärnten, Steiermark  AT2  648
  1  East: Wien, Burgenland, Niederösterreich  AT1  1,145
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Table 4: Inequality, redistribution and economic performance in EU countries. 
Average market income 
relative to EU average 
Market Gini  Disposable 
Gini 
  X  GX  GY 
GX –GY 
Portugal  0.46  0.51425 0.35764 0.15661
    (0.00850) (0.00667) (0.00502)
Greece  0.50  0.48416 0.33627 0.14788
    (0.00582) (0.00416) (0.00394)
Spain  0.56  0.51995 0.32757 0.19239
    (0.00609) (0.00398) (0.00369)
Ireland  0.87  0.51596 0.32364 0.19232
    (0.01033) (0.00855) (0.00519)
Italy  0.87  0.49693 0.35201 0.14491
    (0.00613) (0.00536) (0.00366)
UK  1.07  0.50216 0.31257 0.1896
    (0.00527) (0.00354) (0.00300)
France  1.08  0.48624 0.28689 0.19935
    (0.00383) (0.00295) (0.00275)
Finland  1.08  0.48182 0.2477 0.23412
    (0.00589) (0.00513) (0.00387)
Sweden  1.09  0.49925 0.29714 0.20211
    (0.00593) (0.00748) (0.00308)
Austria  1.12  0.44078 0.23297 0.20781
    (0.00845) (0.00501) (0.00561)
Germany  1.19  0.47013 0.25899 0.21114
    (0.00686) (0.00412) (0.00459)
Belgium  1.20  0.50328 0.26393 0.23935
    (0.01118) (0.00846) (0.00568)
Netherlands  1.21  0.41097 0.24889 0.16208
    (0.00625) (0.00364) (0.00427)
Luxembourg  1.57  0.48072 0.25631 0.22441
    (0.00667) (0.00472) (0.00574)
Denmark  1.69  0.45667 0.23517 0.2215
    (0.01083) (0.00803) (0.00600)
(standard errors in brackets) 
         
-0.5172 -0.8187 0.6577 Correlation coefficient with X 
(p-values)  (0.04840) (0.00020) (0.00770)
Source: EUROMOD. 
Note: Unit of analysis: Household. Distributions are equivalised using the modified OECD scale. Households are 
weighted according to the number of members. 
 









































































































Redistributive effect in EU countries
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Note. Unit of analysis: Household. Distributions are equivalised using the modified OECD scale. Households are weighted 
















































Box Plot: Original Gini in EU regions, by country
 
 
Table 5: Decomposition of the Variance of market and disposable Gini (ANOVA). 
Factor: country. 
anova orig_gini country 
 
                           Number of obs =     100     R-squared     =  0.1617 
                           Root MSE      = .035199     Adj R-squared =  0.0675 
 
                  Source |  Partial SS    df       MS           F     Prob > F 
              -----------+---------------------------------------------------- 
                   Model |  .021272487    10  .002127249       1.72     0.0891 
                         | 
                 country |  .021272487    10  .002127249       1.72     0.0891 
                         | 
                Residual |  .110267137    89  .001238957    
              -----------+---------------------------------------------------- 
                   Total |  .131539624    99  .001328683    
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Picture  by Countries











































































































































































































Market inequality and economic performance in EU regions
 
 
Note Dotted line is shows the Nadaraya-Watson nonparametric regression with a bandwidth of 0.4 The weight function 
(kernel) to calculate the required univariate densities is Biweight. The number of equally spaced points (which define a   
     grid) used for the regression estimation is 100. 



















































































































































































































Market inequality and economic performance in EU regions
 
Note Dotted line is shows the Nadaraya-Watson nonparametric regression with a bandwidth of 0.4 The weight function 
(kernel) to calculate the required univariate densities is Biweight. The number of equally spaced points (which define a   




















































Box Plot: Disposable Gini in EU regions, by country
 
Note: Market Gini is calculated using the household income before tax and transfers. The distribution is 
equivalised using the modified OECD scale. Each household is weighted according to the number of 
members. 
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Table 6: Decomposition of the Variance of disposable Gini (ANOVA). Factor Country. 
 
anova disp_gini country 
                           Number of obs =     100     R-squared     =  0.6887 
                           Root MSE      = .024189     Adj R-squared =  0.6537 
 
                  Source |  Partial SS    df       MS           F     Prob > F 
              -----------+---------------------------------------------------- 
                   Model |  .115189568    10  .011518957      19.69     0.0000 
                         | 
                 country |  .115189568    10  .011518957      19.69     0.0000 
                         | 
                Residual |  .052076204    89  .000585126    
              -----------+---------------------------------------------------- 
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Picture  by Countries
Disposable income Inequality in EU regions.
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Disposable inequality and economic performance in EU regions
 
Note Dotted line is shows the Nadaraya-Watson nonparametric regression with a bandwidth of 0.4 The weight function 
(kernel) to calculate the required univariate densities is Biweight. The number of equally spaced points (which define a   





























































































































































































































Disposable inequality and economic performance in EU regions
 
Note Dotted line is shows the Nadaraya-Watson nonparametric regression with a bandwidth of 0.4 The weight function 
(kernel) to calculate the required univariate densities is Biweight. The number of equally spaced points (which define a   
grid) used for the regression estimation is 100. 
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RE and economic performance in EU regions
 
Note Dotted line is shows the Nadaraya-Watson nonparametric regression with a bandwidth of 0.4 The weight function 
(kernel) to calculate the required univariate densities is Biweight. The number of equally spaced points (which define a   











































































































































































































































RE and economic performance in EU regions
 
Note Dotted line is shows the Nadaraya-Watson nonparametric regression with a bandwidth of 0.4 The weight function 
(kernel) to calculate the required univariate densities is Biweight. The number of equally spaced points (which define a   
grid) used for the regression estimation is 100.   44
  
Table 7: Inequality, redistribution and economic performance 
 
Market Gini  









G b b b + + =  
 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     100 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  2,    97) =   15.66 
       Model |  .032102403     2  .016051202           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |   .09943722    97  .001025126           R-squared     =  0.2441 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.2285 
       Total |  .131539624    99  .001328683           Root MSE      =  .03202 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   orig_gini |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
country_rel  |  -.0225833    .010596    -2.13   0.036    -.0436135   -.001553 
 region_rel  |  -.0826846   .0166385    -4.97   0.000    -.1157074   -.0496619 













G b b b + + =  
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     100 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  2,    97) =   34.54 
       Model |   .06957101     2  .034785505           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  .097694762    97  .001007162           R-squared     =  0.4159 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.4039 
       Total |  .167265772    99  .001689553           Root MSE      =  .03174 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   disp_gini |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
country_rel  |  -.0865462   .0105028    -8.24   0.000    -.1073913   -.0657011 
 region_rel  |   .0296075    .016492     1.80   0.076    -.0031246    .0623397 












XI X X X X G G G b b b b + + + = -  
 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     100 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  3,    96) =   47.26 
       Model |   .09494863     3  .031649543           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  .064291802    96  .000669706           R-squared     =  0.5963 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.5836 
       Total |  .159240432    99  .001608489           Root MSE      =  .02588 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
          re |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   orig_gini |   .4204138   .0820668     5.12   0.000     .2575125    .5833152 
country_rel  |   .0734572   .0087626     8.38   0.000     .0560635    .0908509 
region_rel   |  -.0775304   .0150633    -5.15   0.000    -.1074307   -.0476301 
       _cons |   -.004582   .0391783    -0.12   0.907    -.0823503    .0731863 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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XI P X X G G G b b b b  
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     100 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 12,    87) =   43.94 
       Model |  .136688554    12  .011390713           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  .022551878    87  .000259217           R-squared     =  0.8584 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.8388 
       Total |  .159240432    99  .001608489           Root MSE      =   .0161 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
          re |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   orig_gini |   .4476115   .0557062     8.04   0.000     .3368895    .5583336 
    rel_oeqy |  -.0820596   .0098666    -8.32   0.000    -.1016706   -.0624487 
     Belgium |   .0034392   .0136377     0.25   0.801    -.0236673    .0305456 
     Germany |  -.0008049   .0103125    -0.08   0.938    -.0213022    .0196923 
     Spain   |  -.0474551   .0117142    -4.05   0.000    -.0707384   -.0241718 
     Finland |   .0088255   .0115687     0.76   0.448    -.0141685    .0318195 
     France  |  -.0288338   .0100989    -2.86   0.005    -.0489064   -.0087612 
     Greece  |  -.0826269   .0125598    -6.58   0.000     -.107591   -.0576629 
     Italy   |  -.0801624   .0106562    -7.52   0.000    -.1013427   -.0589821 
     Portugal|   -.085192   .0116504    -7.31   0.000    -.1083485   -.0620355 
     Sweden  |  -.0267723   .0112054    -2.39   0.019    -.0490444   -.0045003 
     UK      |  -.0441652   .0109399    -4.04   0.000    -.0659094    -.022421 
       _cons |   .0125502   .0259257     0.48   0.630      -.03898    .0640804 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Table 8: Country fixed effect on regional inequality. Tests by pairs of country dummies 
(ß3j)   
 
 
  A  B  FI  GE  SW  FR  UK  SP  IT  PT  GR 
A    =  =  =  +  +  +  +  +  +  + 
B      =  =  +  +  +  +  +  +  + 
FI        =  +  +  +  +  +  +  + 
GE          +  +  +  +  +  +  + 
SW            =  +  +  +  +  + 
FR              +  +  +  +  + 
UK                =  +  +  + 
SP                  +  +  + 
IT                    =  = 
PT                      = 
GR                       
 
An ‘=’ means that the redistributive effect in regions in the two countries compared is not statistically different p=0.05. ‘+’ implies 
that a region in country in row show a larger redistributive effect than a region in country in column.    46
 
Map 1 – Market Gini market in EU regions 
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Map 2 – Disposable Gini in EU regions 
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Map 3 – Redistributive effect in EU regions 
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PT3  364.46  1  41  63 
PT15  378.81  2  97  84 
PT2  415.61  3  93  98 
PT12  443.29  4  85  93 
PT14  446.99  5  57  85 
ES7  492.19  6  72  70 
ES6  513.25  7  91  79 
PT11  527.64  8  51  89 
GR1  551.09  9  58  95 
ES4  565.83  10  95  80 
GR2  566.35  11  66  94 
ES1  588.79  12  94  64 
GR4  616.87  13  45  90 
ITA  620.38  14  100  100 
IT92  704.24  15  96  99 
GR3  719.39  16  29  68 
PT13  725.18  17  78  97 
IT8  750.33  18  65  87 
ES5  781.33  19  63  75 
IT91  784.29  20  67  91 
ITB  786.18  21  10  51 
ES2  791.31  22  43  58 
FR83  832.24  23  74  28 
IT7  846.94  24  80  81 
DEG  954.85  25  69  5 
UKB  966.25  26  90  50 
FR3  980.22  27  76  33 
FI13  1003.01  28  86  7 
DEE  1015.35  29  88  3 
UK1  1062.21  30  98  76 
FR25  1083.19  31  33  30 
ES3  1085.13  32  20  73 
FR81  1092.40  33  73  43 
IT5  1095.18  34  14  53 
IT6  1110.73  35  8  83 
FR21  1118.31  36  42  27 
FR53  1133.27  37  62  41 
UK7  1134.32  38  61  57 
FR24  1134.91  39  39  26 
UKA  1136.22  40  54  52 
FR61  1137.68  41  68  45 
DED  1142.54  42  35  2 
FR72  1145.55  43  6  22 
DE4  1159.46  44  36  1 
FR62  1166.08  45  59  55 
FR52  1173.35  46  64  47 
DE8  1177.62  47  25  13 
FI14  1178.51  48  30  6   50
UK2  1186.58  49  79  61 
DE5  1189.91  50  99  35 
FR26  1190.73  51  53  46 
UK9  1191.68  52  75  72 
SE03  1192.80  53  17  20 
FR51  1200.77  54  15  29 
UK8  1202.31  55  82  66 
FR63  1203.48  56  92  86 
SE08  1205.60  57  56  39 
SE06  1216.14  58  32  25 
UK4  1227.46  59  22  54 
FI12  1243.89  60  38  9 
SE07  1249.88  61  16  14 
SE04  1255.12  62  77  59 
AT2  1256.47  63  9  4 
FR82  1261.23  64  84  56 
SE05  1262.72  65  52  34 
IT3  1264.01  66  28  82 
FI15  1267.50  67  48  16 
IT1  1269.88  68  26  78 
FR43  1270.14  69  7  21 
FR23  1272.27  70  1  17 
FR22  1283.55  71  49  62 
DEB  1292.26  72  12  11 
FR41  1297.74  73  47  48 
FR71  1303.61  74  23  38 
SE02  1316.46  75  81  71 
FI2  1328.66  76  31  12 
AT3  1340.91  77  3  8 
BE3  1355.33  78  70  23 
UK6  1396.33  79  40  67 
UK3  1402.45  80  44  74 
DE6  1427.66  81  60  15 
IT2  1447.87  82  46  88 
AT1  1487.42  83  19  19 
DE9  1491.01  84  34  37 
IT4  1515.08  85  5  69 
DEC  1539.45  86  11  10 
DE1  1540.15  87  18  32 
BE2  1543.80  88  71  42 
DE3  1544.97  89  50  44 
DE2  1562.18  90  13  24 
FR42  1594.38  91  4  36 
UK5  1608.73  92  37  77 
BE1  1626.62  93  55  31 
DEF  1629.55  94  2  18 
UK55  1647.79  95  89  92 
DEA  1656.25  96  27  40 
DE7  1673.16  97  83  60 
SE01  1717.49  98  87  96 
FI11  1781.73  99  24  49 
FR1  1929.72  100  21  65 
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